Five Materials, Five Dependency Profiles in the Quantum Computing Value Chain
Quantum computing is almost always approached through algorithms, qubit counts or error-correction performance. This reading leaves a more immediate reality in the shadows: no quantum architecture works without materials whose extraction, processing or purification is concentrated among a limited number of countries and companies.
Applied to five priority materials, our proprietary value chain criticality index reveals several forms of dependency. Some are old and structural. Others are still latent or are beginning to ease as new industrial capacity comes online.
| Level | Material | Determining factor |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Ytterbium | High industrial concentration and risk that suspended Chinese controls are reactivated |
| Critical | Helium-3 | Constrained supply and no equivalent commercial alternative for cooling to the required temperatures |
| To monitor | Niobium | Extreme production concentration, with no major regulatory disruption to date |
| Emerging diversification | Silicon-28 | New industrial capacity appearing in South Africa, China and Europe |
| Partial diversification | Lithium niobate | More widely spread geographic base, but persistent concentration on certain grades and processes |
Ytterbium and helium-3, two critical dependencies, two distinct mechanisms. Ytterbium, used notably in certain neutral-atom and trapped-ion architectures, is among the most critical materials in this selection. Its value chain sits within a heavy rare earth industry highly concentrated in China. On October 9, 2025, Beijing announced new controls covering ytterbium and several other rare earths. They were due to take effect on November 8, 2025. The Chinese government nevertheless suspended them on November 7, until November 10, 2026. As of July 18, 2026, this is therefore not an active restriction on ytterbium, but a legally constituted mechanism that could be reactivated. Industrial concentration is thus compounded by an identifiable regulatory uncertainty.
Helium-3 presents a different risk. Together with helium-4, it is an essential element of the dilution refrigerators used to reach the temperatures needed to operate most superconducting quantum processors. To date, no commercial solution supplies at scale a directly equivalent combination of temperature, stability and cooling power. The absence of a recent regulatory shock therefore does not reduce the dependency, it simply makes it less visible.
Niobium, a highly concentrated vulnerability. Niobium holds a singular position. Brazil accounts for roughly 93% of estimated world mine production in 2025. CBMM alone supplies more than three quarters of the global market from its Araxá complex. No major regulatory or operational disruption has materialized on this chain as of the date of the analysis. This stability should not, however, be mistaken for low exposure: such a high concentration is a latent vulnerability, even without a triggering event. Niobium therefore deserves monitoring that covers production, available capacity, shareholding, supply contracts and the evolution of Brazilian policy.
Silicon-28 and lithium niobate, a diversification still uneven. Silicon-28 is seeing a more favorable industrial evolution. ASP Isotopes announced the start of commercial production in South Africa in March 2025. In Europe, Soitec, STMicroelectronics and Quobly are developing an integrated chain around silicon-28 enriched substrates. In June 2026, China also announced its first large-scale domestic production exceeding 99.99% isotopic purity. These developments gradually broaden the production base, without yet being enough to conclude that the risk has disappeared, because volumes, purity levels, actually available capacity and access conditions remain decisive.
Lithium niobate also shows a less extreme concentration than ytterbium, helium-3 or niobium. Its situation must nevertheless be analyzed by crystal quality, wafer formats, manufacturing processes and the photonic uses targeted. In the absence of historical series demonstrating an actual decline in concentration, it is more prudent to speak of partial diversification than of a fragility that is receding.
What this hierarchy allows. This analysis does not publish the proprietary calculation method of the index. It makes public the results, the determining factors and the differences in nature between the risks observed. The hierarchy thus distinguishes three responses: immediately securing the most exposed supplies, monitoring concentrations that are still stable but may become binding, and supporting the chains whose industrial diversification is starting to materialize.